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Summary
trnfluence of business firms on the government
An investigation aboui the distribution of influence in the Netherlands
Society.
Discussions about 'influence' and 'power' have evoked intense emotions in
the last few decades. In the U.S.A. this happened for example in connection
with The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills. In The Netherlands too, similar
discussions are being held. In the opinion of many people, influence and
power lie at the root of numerous social problems. Who is to be called 'in-
fluential' or 'powerful', however, seems to depend on the stand one takes,
rather than on the facts.
In the social sciences there is distinctly a lack of good methods to determine
influence and power. The four methods used most often, all use data that
are very 'indirect' (positions, reputations, participation in decisions and
sociometric patterns, respectively). Because of these superficial indicators,
one does not measure with these methods what one should actually measure.
In this study, a new method is outlined to determine 'influence', especially
influence on the Governmenr. In these days the Government has at its
disposal large quantities of 'scarce means' - money, authority - which are
being intensively desired by its citizens, their pressure groups and their
organizations.
'Influence' may simply be taken to mean: the extent to whích the problems
of the citizens have been solved by the Government. Hence influence may
be represented by a simple index, namely by the nunnber of 'effects' one has
achieved. Now the central question is: who has much influence and who
only little * hence what actually is the distributíon of influence.
The field of investigation chosen for this study is that of the influence of
Dutch business f irms on the Government, more specifically with respect to




57 'other' firms, depending on waterways.
The managing directors of all these firms were interviewed.
In accordance with our method, we acted as follows:
I - we observed the problems of the firms;
2 - we ascertained whether for thcse problems inf luence-attcmpts (interest-
demands) were made with the Government;
3 - we examined whether these influence-attempts were successful.
The number of successful influence-attempts forms thc final measure for
influence. This measure tells us only little concerning the question, as to
with which 'party' possible differences in influence arise. For influence may
be due to the activity of the firms, but just as well to a willing Government.
In order to examine this more closely, we have split up influence into three
' inf lucnce aspccts' ,  based on combinations of the elements (1,2,3) just
mentioned.
Two aspects characterize the business firms, namely:
a - Latcnt antícipation * this is the extent to which a firm is aware of its
problems annex'influence possibilities'.
b - ll'lanif est anticipation - this is the extent to which a firm makes influence-
attempts with the Government for the solution of its problems.
The third aspect specially characterizes the behaviour of the Government
(making decisions):
c-'Tested influence' - this is the extent to which the'influence-attempts'of
a firm are successful.
our method completely meets the well-known objections Bachrach and
Í]aratz raised against the decision-method.
ln our investigation we tested a number of current hypotheses. The main
results of this test are the following:
Our main hypothesis.' that large ftrms have more influence on the Govern-
ment than small ones * - was nol confirmed with respect to two out of three
'influence aspects', namely'tested influence' and manifest anticipation (chap-
ters 6 and 7).
This result is especially surprising so far as 'tested influence' is concerned. It
means that the decisions made by the Government are not relatively to the
advantage of the large firms. By way of illustration we might also mention
that in our investigation we did not find any indications for a compa-
ratively great influence of the branches belonging to multinational concerns;
so this is contrary to a view that is very prominent at present.
* In this study the number of employees of a firm is indicative of its size.
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h4anifest anticipation does not vary with the size of the firm either. Only
latent anticipation - the number of problems the firms itself perceives -
increases when the firm is larger.
The second hypothesis stated that, when various firms form coalitions in
order to influence the Government, this influence will be greater, as the size
of the coalition is larger. This hypothesis is in a way confirmed by our data
(chapter 7). We also found indications that the influence of the coalitions
was greater when there were 'spokesmen' (e.g. interest organizations, muni-
cipal authorities). This result, which was especially manifest in case of
small-sized coalitions, points to the significance of the 'degree ol organi-
zatíon' of the coalition.
The first and second hypothesis are both derived from a basic hypothesis,
namely that the influence of comparable societal 'parts' is proportionate to
their size. This most general hypothesis is not confirmed in case of separate
firms, whereas in case coalitions of firms, it is.
As incidental result we found that the degree of participation in the activities
of the coalition was practically equally high in case of large and small firms.
This result differs considerably from that of collective actions, which we
investigated in other projects (cf. Braam and Swinkels, Socíologische Gids,
1969).In these collective actions - where the interests of many more firms
were involved and which bore a more emotional character - the larger firms
participated very clearly to a larger extent than the small ones.
- The third hypothesis refers to the 'tested influence' only and has been
formulated ad hoc. It states that the 'tested influence'- the extent to which
the Government complies with the firms' interest-demands - will depend on
the degree of growth of the firm. For this hypothesis we found fairly strong
indications. The 'growers' appear to obtain from the Government relatively
more favourable decisions than the 'non-growers' (see chapter 9).
- A number of additional hypotheses refers to the 'inlluencc baseí, of which
we have traced whether they show any relationship with the 'influence
aspects'(chapter 10).
A - To our surprise the'tested ínf luence' does not appeaÍ to vary with:
- ocpe rtness within the business firm;
- membershíp ol clubs, such as the Rotary;
-' p a r t ic ula r i s t ic r e I at i o ns' with public authorities.
The 'tested influence' does vary with the extent to which one is a member
of, or occupies a position in'interest-organízations'.
B-Manífest anticípalion shows hardly any correlations with the various
'influence bases'.
C - It appears that latent anticipation does not vaÍy with the extent to which
one is a member of, or occupies a position in'interest organizationí.
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Under certain conditions latent anticipation may possibly vary with:
- expertness;
- membership of c/aós such as the Rotary;
- partícularistic relations with public authorities;
- c o s tno p ol itan orientation.
(All those factors also markedly correlate with the size of the firm. Drawing
conclusions about the separate significance of the 'influence bases' is not
possible and maybe would not even seF/e any useful purpose. That is why
I speak of 'possible' relationships here.)
Broadly speaking, 'tested influence' therefore only depends on the degree of
growth and on the membership of, or the position in'interest-organizationsl.
Latent anticipation, which indicates the starting points for influence, shows
a relationship with the size of the firm and - probably closely connected
with this - sometimes with expertness, clubs, particularistic relations, and
cosmopolitan orientation.
From the results of the 'tested influence' we may carefully draw conclusions
concerning the correctness of some assumptions taken from Mills' The
Power Elite.
l. Mills' idea that there is an elite based on two grounds, namely common
interests as well as social connections, does not hold good in the field of
our investigation: the 'social connections' and the 'tested influence' do not
correlate at all or only very slightly so.
2. There are indeed indications for the existence of elites on the ground of
coincidence of interests. Our data do not, however, point in the direction of
one closed elite, but to two distinctly separated fields:
'interest organizations' / Government
growing firms / Covernment
On these grounds we must conclude there are elites that are, to say the least,
partly separated.
The value of the 'position-method' and the 'sociometric method' could be
examined. This value proved to be questionable.
Whether these results also hold good for other fields of influence and for
other firms - is a question which, on the basis of one investigation with
this method, cannot be answered.
Our hope that the method used to determine influence is more generally
applicable, seems to be justified by the experience gathered during this
investigation. Moreover, the method could also be useful in evaluatíon-
research of Government policy, especially because the method can reveal
in how far this policy causes inequality.
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